In tro d u ctio n
A peculiar feature of foreign aid is that while it often forms a significant part of national incom e for recipient countries, it typically only constitutes a sm all part of the national incom e of donor countries (Chong & Gradstein, 20 0 8) . This raises the interesting question, why don't donor countries give m ore and what determ ines how m uch they give? Public opinion about foreign aid in the donor country is im portant in influencing how m uch countries give (Stern, 1998) . This suggests that studying the factors that determine public opinion in donor countries can contribute to a better understanding of foreign aid from the perspective of the donor country.
In this study we address the question: What determines public support for foreign aid in China? In addressing this question we focus on China as a don or of foreign aid, rather than as a recipient of foreign aid. China's foreign aid program is relatively small, but it is getting bigger, growing at an annual rate of 30 percent between 20 0 4 and 20 0 9 (Information Office of the State Council, 20 11). In 20 13 China's foreign aid budget was US$ 6.4 billion, equivalent to 0 .0 7 percent of the country's GDP (Brant, 20 14) . China's growing foreign aid program poses a series of challenges to the existing nexus established by the OECD-DAC and the World Bank (Dreher & Fuchs, 20 14; Dreher et al., 20 13; Dreher et al., 20 11) . There has been extensive discussion on whether Chinese foreign aid, which allegedly does not im pose political con ditions on recipient countries, is a better alternative to western foreign aid in term s of fostering local capacity an d good governance (Sorensen, 20 10 ; Wang et al., 20 14) . Debate has centered on whether aid from China an d other em erging donors has bolstered rogue states, fuelled corruption and increased the debt of poor countries (Woods, 20 0 8 ).
China's bilateral aid is now approaching that of France and its foreign aid is expected to be on a par with the top five DAC m em bers by 20 15 (Kitano & Harada, 20 14) . Chin a will also be the m ajor finan cial underwriter of the New Developm ent Bank, which is soon to be launched by the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, In dia, China and South Africa), in a bid to challenge the existing institutions of international aid dom inated by the West (The Econom ist, 20 14).
1 There has been a strong debate among China's geopolitical rivals that why aid is still being provided to a country that is now the world's second largest economy (see e.g. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2011). In 2011, Japan provided US$800 million in development aid to China; in 2013, the United States provided US$28 million in development aid to China (Fish, 2013) . 2 China is not a DAC member and its aid does not easily fit into the OECD's ODC definition. However, Kitano and Harada (2014) use the ODA standard to redefine Chinese aid in order to compare China and DAC members. See also Wolf et al. (2013) for a comparison between differing definitions of aid in the OECD and China.
Most existing studies on Chin a's foreign aid program have focused on one of three areas; the amount of foreign aid (e.g. Strange et al., 20 14) , the effectiveness of foreign aid (e.g. Renwick, 20 14; Schiere, 20 14) and the institutions underpinning the allocation of foreign aid (e.g. Watson, 20 14; Xu et al., 20 14; Xue, 20 14) . Recently, calls have been m ade to broaden the study of China's foreign aid program beyon d these areas (Bräutigam , 20 11; Kitano, 20 14) . In particular, research is needed on public opinion in China, given that this is likely to be an im portant determ in ant of China's foreign aid program in the future (Shim om ura & Ohashi, 20 13).
A better understanding of public opinion about foreign aid is im portant. In traditional donor countries public opinion has had a significant influence on aid policy through the electoral system (Lancaster, 20 0 6; Shim om ura & Ohashi, 20 13) . There is, however, little research on the extent to which the Chin ese public support China's foreign aid program (Shim om ura & Ohashi, 20 13).
The existing eviden ce is piecem eal an d has varied in its m ajor conclusions. On on e hand, a few articles have noted that segm ents of the Chinese public have criticized the Chinese governm ent for giving foreign aid to other countries when developm ent challenges rem ain sign ificant within Chin a (Branigan, 20 13; Brant, 20 13). 3 In exam ining the determ inants of Chinese public opinion on China's foreign aid program an d the extent to which the Chin ese public believe that its governm ent should be prioritizing dom estic developm ent vis-à-vis financing foreign aid, this study contributes to the existing literature on foreign aid in m ultiple ways.
Based on observation of online responses to China's donation of 23 school buses to Macedonia, ten days after a school bus crash in Gansu province with a death toll of 19 preschool children, Brant (20 13) asserts: 'It is hard for the Chin ese to be open about foreign aid, especially when they are giving it to countries that m ay have a GDP per capita higher than China's own.' On the other hand, a recent survey found that 46 per cent of urban citizen s favor China providing foreign aid to developing countries (InterMedia, 20 12) . This was the secon d largest share am ong the five surveyed countries (i.e. China, France, Germ any, the United Kingdom , an d the United States).
First, this study contributes to the sparse literature on public opinion about aid in donor countries (Milner & Tingley, 20 13) . There is lim ited research on m ass attitudes towards aid in recipient and donor countries (Chong & Gradstein, 20 0 8 ; Goldsm ith et al., 20 14; Kn ack & Paxton, 20 0 8 ) . These studies only examine donors that are developed countries. This study is the first to exam ine public opinion towards foreign aid in a developing country, which is both a recipient and donor of aid.
Second, we contribute to the study of public opinion on foreign aid in an authoritarian regim e in which there is no electoral m echanism . Existing studies have studied how public opinion influences foreign aid in dem ocratic donor countries. While China does not have an electoral m echanism , this is n ot to say that the governm ent is not responsive to public opinion. In China the influence of public opinion on foreign policy formulation has evolved over tim e (Reilly, 20 11) . At the sam e tim e, the Chin ese governm ent has becom e increasingly consultative in m aking foreign policy (Williams, 20 14) an d has exhibited a willingness to cooperate with DAC m em bers (Xu & Carey, 20 14) . However, because of lim ited data availability an d political sensitivities, there are few studies of the impact of public opinion on foreign affairs in Chin a. Existing lim ited studies on China's foreign policy have centered on public opinion regarding Chin a's policy towards J apan (Reilly, 20 11) and foreign countries and the im pact of globalization (Lee et al., 20 14) .
. D a ta an d m e th o d
This study uses data from two surveys of the Chinese populace. The first dataset contains 1,991 respon dents from the 20 0 7 World Values Survey (WVS), which was adm in istered in 23 provinces in China. 4 The second dataset contains 10 ,151 respondents from the 20 0 6 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), which was a nationally-representative survey, adm in istered in 27 provin ces. 5 [ Tables 1 and 2 here]   Tables 1 and 2 contain descriptive statistics for both surveys. In the WVS, the key question asked: 'Should the Chin ese govern m ent give top priority to assist reducin g poverty in the world or to solve your own country's problem s?' Respon dents answered on a 10 -point scale, in which 1 denoted giving top priority to solving dom estic problem s an d 10 denoted giving top priority to solving the world's problem s. In the WVS, m ost respondents believed that priority should be given to addressin g China's dom estic problem s over giving to other countries (m ean score: 2.70 ).
In the CGSS the three key questions asked respondents whether China should expand its econom ic aid to other developing countries, expand m edical aid to Africa and sen d troops to participate in United Nations peacekeeping. 6 It is essential to distinguish factors potentially influencing support for foreign aid at the individual level from those at the aggregate level. In a large country, such as China, provin ces vary in term s of political, econom ic and cultural characteristics, which could influence individual support for aid (Paxton & Knack, 20 12) . Only a few studies (e.g. 20 13; Paxton & Knack, 20 12) consider Overall, 77-8 5 per cent of respondents supported the expansion of the three types of aid. 4 For more details about the WVS, see www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 5 See Bian and Li (2012) for details on sample design, data collection and quality control in the CGSS. 6 Medical aid is an important part of China's foreign aid program (Liu et al., 2014 the hierarchical structure of determinants of support for aid, even though such need is explicitly em phasized (Prather, 20 11) .
We em ploy a multi-level m ixed (MLM) m odel containing both fixed an d ran dom effects. It specifically takes into account that respondents are selected in different provinces with different levels of socioeconom ic developm ent. Following the existing literature (e.g. Steenbergen & J ones, 20 0 2), the level-1 m odel is in the form of:
where y ij is the depen dent variable for an individual i (= 1,…, N i) nested in a province j (= 1,…, Jj); xij is the level-1 vector of independent variables (e.g. characteristics an d attitudes of the individual); and εij is a level-1 disturbance term . The fixed effects at level-1 units are analogous to standard regression coefficients. The random effects of regression param eters vary across level-2 units (i.e. provinces). Therefore the variation of level-1 param eters can be m odeled as a function of level-2 predictors:
where the γ-param eters are the fixed level-2 param eters and zij denotes a vector of level-2 predictor for an in dividual i; an d the δ-param eters are disturbances, im plying that the level-2 predictors are not assum ed to account perfectly for the variation in the level-1 param eters. The level-1 m odel (equation 1) and level 2 model (equations 2 and 3) can be com bined into a single equation. This can be represen ted as follows:
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where γ00 is the constant; γ01 is the effect of the level-2 predictor; γ10 is the level-1 predictor; and γ11 is the effect of cross level interaction between level-1 and level-2 predictors; am ong the random param eters, δ0j is the residual level-2 variation in the level-1 intercept that rem ain s after controlling for zij, δ1j is the residual level-2 variation in the level-1 slope for xij after controlling for zij, and εij is the level-1 disturbance. The level-2 predictors in clude provincial data on population size, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, foreign direct investment (FDI) per capita, average annual GDP growth rate over the past five years, poverty rate and whether the province is eligible to receive dom estic aid and transfers un der the Western Developm ent Program . 7
7 Statistics on population size, GDP, FDI and average growth rate are obtained and calculated from the China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007) ; the poverty rate is calculated from the CGSS data using a relative poverty line (20 per cent of provincial median income). Western region includes Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunan, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia and Tibet.
These factors m atters for public support for dom estic an d international policies (Ali et al., 20 14; Mahler et al., 20 0 0 ; Paxton & Knack, 20 12) .
. W h a t e xp la in s p u blic s u p p o rt fo r givin g fo re ign a id ?
Previous research suggests that public support for foreign aid is influenced by political, religious and social participation and views; trust in governm ent an d other state institutions; satisfaction with one's lot in life and financial status; social status; trust in others and dem ographic characteristics in level-1; as well an array of provincial/ state level characteristics in level-2. In this section, we consider each of these factors in turn and discuss the m easurement of some key constructs.
Po lit ica l, R e lig io u s a n d So cia l Pa r t icip a t io n a n d Vie w s
We exam ine several variables related to religious, social an d political participation and views. Participation in political and social organ izations is likely to be at least partly m otivated by altruistic considerations. Such in dividuals are likely to be m ore com m unity m inded and this is likely to be m otivated by a desire to assist others (Paxton & Kn ack, 20 12) . Being religious is also likely to be positively correlated with altruism , philanthropy and trust. Most religions prom ote a com passionate outlook toward others an d encourage em pathy toward those less fortunate (Paxton & Kn ack, 20 12) . The WVS contains a response: 'People in society treat m e fairly'. Based on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) , we expect that people who perceive that others threat them fairly are likely to reciprocate and feel altruistic toward others. Such people, consequently, are m ore likely to support foreign aid. p. 3) suggest that 'as a policy issue, developm ent aid is characterized by low salience, low knowledge and strong opinions'. The notion of low-inform ation rationality suggests that 'citizens use inform ation shortcuts to form opinions on politics even when they lack expert knowledge' (Paxton & Knack, 20 12, p. 174) . If individuals feel that the poor are lazy, or can easily escape poverty, then they are unlikely to support aid (Paxton & Knack, 20 12) . In the CGSS, we use several m easures of attitudes towards poverty; nam ely, the poor lack adequate education, people are in poverty because they are lazy, the governm ent is responsible for poverty and the governm ent should tax the rich to help the poor. If people perceive that the poor are lazy or do not want to work they will oppose foreign aid on the basis that either the poor cannot be helped or are undeserving of assistan ce. However, if people believe that the poor lack hum an capital, this can be addressed by expen diture on education and they will support foreign aid.
People's positions on the left-right political spectrum , and their attitudes about the poor in general, can help predict their attitudes about the provision of foreign aid. Foreign aid represents a form of governm ent intervention in the international m arketplace. Thus, in western countries conservatives are typically opposed to econom ic aid. However, it is im portant to realize that the left-right political spectrum has a different interpretation in China than in western countries. Relatively speaking, leftists/ conservatives tend to uphold Maoist ideals, be m ore egalitarian and support nationalism , while opposing globalization and western-style dem ocracy. Meanwhile, rightists/ liberals tend to oppose governm ent interference, em brace western culture, agitate for universal values of human rights and freedom s and support the introduction of representative dem ocracy (Carter, 20 10 ) .
We expect that the m ore conservative one is in China, the m ore supportive of foreign aid on e should be because foreign aid prom otes socialist ideals of support for the less well-off and is often used to further nationalist/ strategic interests (as in foreign aid to Africa sin ce the Maoist era). Giving foreign aid m ay also im prove the im age of the donor (Goldsm ith et al., 20 14) , which m ay appeal to the nationalistic sentim ents of conservatives in China. The corollary is that m ore liberal one is, the less supportive of foreign aid one can be expected to be because in an authoritarian state, like China, the foreign aid program lacks transparen cy and accountability. As a consequen ce, liberals see it as potentially fueling corruption and abuse of funds.
The WVS contains questions on whether taxing the rich to help the poor is an essential characteristic of dem ocracy, whether China's needs a dem ocratic system and the im portance of dem ocracy to Chin a. H igher scores on answers to these question s indicate m ore liberal attitudes. The specifications with the CGSS use variables based on a principal com ponents analysis of questions that capture the political ideology dim ension of the left-right scale. We constructed a variable of factor scores for respondents' support for fighting for self-interest through public gatherings, m arching and protesting, striking and petitioning (xinfang). With the exception of strikes, these rights are legally recognized in China, but the governm ent views them as disruptive (King et al., 20 13, 20 14; Li et al., 20 12) . A higher factor score indicates a m ore conservative attitude toward challenging the state an d expressing self-interest through these activities. Drawing this discussion together, we expect that those who are m ore conservative, and m ore nationalistic, will be m ore supportive of foreign aid.
At t it u d e s t o w a r d s In s t it u t io n s
Trust in governm ent has been used to predict foreign aid preferences (Chong & Gradstein, 20 0 8 ; Milner & Tingley, 20 0 8 ; Paxton & Knack, 20 12; Prather, 20 11) . Based on the political legitim acy theory, those who have trust in governm ents, authorities, institutions and social arrangem ents can be expected to be m ore supportive of any governm ent activity (Ali et al., 20 14; Tyler, 20 0 6 ). Hetherington and Globetti (20 0 2) suggest that having trust in government is particularly important for supporting policies that involve allocation of funds to others, such as foreign aid. In China, state institutions include not only government, but also include the print m edia, television and other state-controlled m edia. The WVS contains a variable on who should be respon sible for deciding foreign aid between governm ents of nation states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Those that believe governm ents of nation states should decide foreign aid are m ore likely to support foreign aid.
For the analysis using the CGSS, we constructed three factor score variables denoting trust towards the government, state-controlled central m edia an d private sources of inform ation, with higher scores in dicating higher level of trust. Because the specific form s of aid are closely identified with China's reputation or identity (e.g. helping African frien ds or assisting United Nation s peacekeeping), higher levels of trust towards state institutions can be expected to have a positive correlation with support for aid. Therefore, we expect that those with higher trust in state-controlled m edia and the governm ent are m ore likely to support aid because they are m ore supportive of state institutions, and that those with more trust in private sources of information have less trust in state institutions and are less likely to support aid.
Su b je ct iv e In d ica t o r s
Following existing studies (Chong & Gradstein, 20 0 8 ; Milner & Tingley, 20 0 8; Paxton & Knack, 20 12; Prather, 20 11), we also control for a set of subjective indicators. These in clude: one's trust towards other people (in the WVS only), satisfaction with on e's financial situation, satisfaction with one's life an d selfperceived social class. Generosity towards others increases with trust (Bekkers, 20 0 7). Trust and satisfaction with one's financial situation and satisfaction with one's life are linked to altruism and have been found to be positively correlated with support for foreign aid (Paxton & Knack, 20 12 ). In addition, existing studies for developed countries suggest that individuals from higher social classes should support foreign aid on the assum ption that they are better placed to reap the benefits from foreign outreach (Chong & Gradstein, 20 0 8; Milner & Tingley, 20 0 8; Prather, 20 11) .
D e m o g r a p h ic a n d So cio e co n o m ic Ch a r a ct e r is t ics
Finally, we control for dem ographic and socioeconom ic characteristics, which are likely to be related to preferen ces for altruism and econom ic self-interest. These characteristics in clude age, gen der, having a child, health, education and in com e.
Som e research suggests that younger people tend to be m ore supportive of foreign aid (Paxton & Knack, 20 12; Prather, 20 11; van H eerde & Hudson, 20 10 ) . However, these studies treat support for foreign aid as a linear function of age and do not test whether there is a U-shaped relationship between age an d support for foreign aid. There is som e eviden ce that older people are m ore likely to support charitable causes. For instance, a study on adult age-related differences in altruism finds that older adults were m ore likely to donate m oney to a good cause, to report valuing contributions to the public good and to behave altruistically com pared with younger and m iddle-aged adults 20 14) . We expect that support for foreign aid will be non-linear; ie. higher am ong younger and older people.
We expect there to be gender differences in support for foreign aid. Specifically, we expect that wom en will be m ore supportive of foreign aid than m en. Wom en tend to be m ore altruistic than m en because wom en are socialized to take care of one another (Paxton & Knack, 20 12) . Men are m ainly socialized to be in com petition with each other (Dietz et al., 20 0 2) . In the United States, wom en have been found to be m ore 'liberal' than m en (Edlund & Pande, 20 0 2) . Individuals with liberal values (in a western dem ocratic sense) are m ore likely to support foreign aid.
The effect of having a child on support for foreign aid is unclear. On the one hand, it m ay be that having a child broadens one's perspective, engendering em pathy toward others and, thus, by extension, support for foreign aid (Paxton & Kn ack, 20 12) . There m ight be spillover effects from child to parent if the parent learns m ore about developm ent needs overseas through de facto exposure to the child's curriculum (Henson & Lindstrom , 20 13) . On the other hand, from the perspective of econom ic self-interest, parents m ay feel that their governm ent should allocate m ore resources to their children's future rather than on foreign aid (Kn ack & Paxton, 20 0 8 ).
The effects of health, income and human capital endowment on support for foreign aid are also uncertain. On the one hand, those who have higher in com es, m ight be m ore flexible in their attitude toward risk taking and this m ight encourage altruism (Paxton & Knack, 20 12) . Those who are better educated are m ore likely to hold progressive views on social issues an d be m ore international in outlook 20 13) , both of which are likely to be correlated with increased support for foreign aid. Research suggests that altruistic em otions and behaviors are associated with better health (Post, 20 0 5) . Therefore, people with better health m ight be m ore likely to support foreign aid. On the other hand, there m ay be a n egative relationship between the econom ic endowm ent variables and foreign econom ic aid. Education, health status and incom e are correlated. Individuals with better health, higher education an d incom e pay a greater share of taxes an d, thus, m ay be less enthusiastic about giving aid to foreign countries (Prather, 20 11) .
Pr o v in cia l Ch a r a ct e r is t ics
We expect that provinces with a larger population are m ore likely to support aid because of better information flow, which m ay lead to greater exposure to international affairs.
Provincial GDP, FDI per capita and annual growth rate are included as m easures of aggregate level econom ic conditions, open ness and exposure to foreign affairs. Sim ilar to the effect of incom e at the individual level, the directions of their effects are uncertain.
To address the increasing disparities between eastern an d western regions and the discontentm ent of western provinces towards poverty and un balanced regional developm ent, in 20 0 0 the Chinese governm ent initiated the Western Developm ent Program , which has provided preferential policies for econom ic developm ent and m assive funding for infrastructure, environment protection, human capital and social welfare (Lai, 20 0 2). The program m ay have helped reduce region al disparities an d poverty, but they rem ain pronounced (Xie & Zhou, 20 14) . In the first ten years of the program m ore than US$ 325 billion were invested on projects, an d in recent years the Chinese governm ent continues to invest m ore than US$ 50 billion per year on n ew projects in the western region (Edwards, 20 12) . It is anticipated that people from western provinces, or provinces with higher poverty rates, are less likely to support foreign aid while their own needs for developm ent support rem ains very strong. Table 3 presents the results from the WVS using two-level linear m ixed m odels with fixed effects at the individual level and ran dom effects at the provincial level. The interclass correlation (ICC) demonstrates that about 7 per cent of the total variance in the support for prioritizing international poverty reduction can be attributed to between-province differences. In each of the four specifications, the likelihood ratio tests for the m ixed m odel against a single-level linear regression indicate that the m ixed m odel with province random effects at level-2 perform better than the singlelevel regression m odel.
Re s u lts

R e s u lt s fr o m t h e W VS
[ Table 3 here] Our analysis focuses on Model 4, which con tains a full set of variables an d has the sm allest Akaike inform ation criterion (AIC) value, indicating that it has relatively better fit. Am ong the dem ographic and socioeconom ic indicators, individual support for foreign aid exhibits a non-linear U-shaped relationship in which support bottom s out at 45 years of age. Men are less likely to support foreign aid than wom en. The coefficient on having a child is statistically insignificant. The findings for the endowm ent variables are m ixed. We fin d no significant relationship between health or education and support for foreign aid. We find a negative relationship between incom e and support for foreign aid, which is consistent across all four m odels. A oneunit increase in the incom e decile decreases support for foreign aid by 0 .127 points.
Am ong the subjective indicators, we fin d that the coefficients on trusting others and satisfaction with one's financial position are statistically insignificant, while support for aid decreases by 0 .28 1 points for each one unit increase in level of life satisfaction. The coefficient on life satisfaction, however, is only weakly sign ificant. Support for foreign aid increases by 0 .217 points for each one-unit increase in social class.
Among the different types of participation in organizations, we fin d that political an d religious participation increases support for foreign aid. The m agnitude of the effect of religious participation (0 .390 points) and political participation (0 .327 points) are relatively large. However, other form s of com m unity and sports participation are statistically insign ificant. Am ong the variables denoting socio-political views, those who perceive that others treat them fairly are less likely to support foreign aid, although the coefficient is only weakly significant. Those who are m ore rightist/ liberal (i.e. regard taxing the rich to support the poor as an essential characteristic of dem ocracy; that Chin a n eeds a dem ocratic system and perceive dem ocracy to be im portant) are less supportive of aid. Those have higher trust of the print m edia are less likely to support aid. However, those with m ore trust of television are m ore likely to support aid. Com pared with individual governm ents, those who believe that the United Nations should decide aid are less likely to support the Chinese governm ent prioritizing intern ational developm ent.
The param eters at level-2 indicate that the effects of population size, GDP per capita and FDI per capita on support for foreign aid are statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, the annual growth rate has a positive effect while the poverty rate an d living in a western province has a n egative effect on support for foreign aid.
R e s u lt s fr o m t h e CGSS
Models 1-3 in Table 4 present the results from the CGSS using logit two-level m ixed m odels for three types of aid (econom ic aid, m edical aid to Africa and UN peacekeeping). Model 4 presents the results using a Poisson two-level m ixed m odel, in which the depen dent variable is the n um ber of foreign aid types that the respondent supports. The ICCs of m odels 1-3 show that approxim ately 4 per cent of total variance in the support for foreign aid can be attributed to between-province differences. The likelihood ratio tests show that all m ixed m odels perform better than single-level m odels.
[ Table 4 here]
The variables denoting dem ographic and socioeconom ic characteristics are largely insignificant across Models 1-4. In Model 3, m en are m ore likely than wom en to support participation in UN peacekeeping. This result is not totally unexpected. Wom en tend to be less m ilitaristic and m ore opposed to spending on war or m ilitary conflicts overseas com pared with m en (Greeno & Maccoby, 1993) . Findings for the United States suggest that m en are m ore likely to support foreign spending on the m ilitary than wom en, while wom en are m ore likely than m en to support foreign spending on hum anitarian causes (Milner & Tingley, 20 13 ).
There are mixed results for the effect of endowments on public support for foreign aid. Health is statistically insignificant in Models 1, 2 and 4 an d has a weakly positive effect on support for participation in United Nations peacekeeping in Model 3. Consistent with the WVS results, income has a negative effect on support for econom ic aid in Model 1, but is statistically insignificant in the other three m odels. There are strong effects of education in Models 1 and 2. Com pared to those with no qualifications, all other groups except those with a postgraduate degree are m ore likely to support econom ic aid and m edical aid to Africa.
Am ong the subjective indicators, Models 1, 2 and 4 suggest that people who are m ore satisfied with their lives are m ore likely to support econom ic aid, m edical aid to Africa and are more likely to support multiple aid types. Model 3 suggests that the people with higher self-perceived social class are m ore likely to support participation in United Nations peacekeeping, consistent with expectations. The coefficient on satisfaction with one's financial situation is in significant in each m odel.
The effects of political and religious participation are largely insignificant. With the exception of Buddhism , being religious has no effect on support for foreign aid. Com pared to Com m unist Party m em bers, m em bers of the Communist Youth League and those without political affiliation are m ore likely to support m edical aid to Africa (Model 2). Respondents who expressed the view that the poor lack adequate education are m ore likely to support aid in Models 1-3, while those who believed the poor do not want to work are less likely to support UN peacekeeping in Model 3. Believing governm ent is responsible for poverty has statistically positive effects on support for m edical aid an d UN peacekeepin g. Believing that the governm ent should tax the rich has a statistically sign ificant positive effect on support for aid in Models 1-4. Disapproval of expression of self-interest also has a statistically significant positive effect on support for each type of aid in Models 1-3 as well as Model 4.
In terms of attitudes towards institutions, the coefficients on having trust in governm ent and trusting private sources of inform ation have un expected signs in Model 2 and Model 1 respectively, but are only weakly significan t. Trust in statecontrolled central m edia an d beliefs that one should follow the governm ent and support one's country have a positive effect on support for aid across all m odels.
Am ong the level-2 variables, population size is insign ificant in all m odels, GDP per capita has a n egative effect on support for aid in Models 1 an d 2 and FDI per capita has a negative effect on support for econom ic aid in Model 1. These fin dings are consistent with the negative effect of personal income on support for aid at the individual level. In other words, in the aggregate, richer provinces do not exhibit greater support for foreign aid. Given that we control for respondents' own incom e levels and subjective indictors (including satisfaction with finan ce), these results im ply that respondents living in wealthier provinces opposing foreign aid in favor of dom estic redistribution (Paxton & Knack, 20 12) . Meanwhile, faster growing provinces are m ore likely to support all three types of aid. Sim ilar to the WVS results, the poverty rate has a negative effect in all m odels, while living in a western province has a negative effect on support for econom ic and m edical aid.
. Co n clu s io n an d Po licy Im p licatio n s
The results in this paper break new ground in the sense that they present the first eviden ce on the determ inants of public support for aid in a developing country that is both a recipient an d a donor of foreign aid as well as the first eviden ce on the determ inants of public support for aid in an authoritarian regim e. The Chinese case is particularly interestin g given the ongoing debate in that country about the extent to which China should be giving aid to other countries, m any of which have higher GDP per capita than Chin a, at a tim e when China faces considerable developm ent challenges.
This study applies a hierarchical m odel, in which both individual and provincial characteristics are included in the analysis. Across the two datasets our results suggest that a complex array of factors determine public support for foreign aid. Debate has centered on the extent to which dem ographic characteristics versus sociopolitical views determ ine support for foreign aid (Henson & Lindstrom , 20 13) . Our results suggest that one's political ideology and sense of national identity are the m ost im portant determ inants of public support for aid in China. However, dem ographic characteristics (gender, education, age an d incom e) were also im portant in at least som e of the specifications. We also find that those living in the relatively econom ic-disadvantaged western provinces an d in provinces with higher poverty rates express less support for giving foreign aid.
While care m ust be taken in drawing con clusions from this study for donor countries m ore generally, the results suggest som e im portant policy im plications. The first is that there m ay be better payoffs in targeting engagem ent activities at specific dem ographic segm ents. The second is that an im portant predictor of public support is whether in dividuals trust the governm ent and, hence, public perception of how effective the governm ent is in term s of en suring the aid is well spen t is an im portant factor influencing public opin ion. This suggests that m uch can be gained by a com m unications strategy that dem onstrates aid is effective. The third is that cam paigns prom oting foreign aid should not only 'sell' the effectiveness of such aid, but also play on the value to the donor in term s of enhancing its n ational reputation. 
